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The role of the city in the modem electronic  age is rapidly changing. Cities are no longer closed
islands of local opportunities, but are open nodal points in a global network environment. The
Information and Communication Technology (ICT) has lifted the traditional physical - geographical
constraints which kept cities imprisoned since the early genesis of modem cities. More openness
means  also  more actors in the global economie  playing field, so that cities tend to become increasingly
competitors of each  other. In such  a competitive game between cities the success  conditions are
largely determined by the adjustment potential, and the flexibility and resilience of several
stakeholders in urban life. The paper analyses the causes  and implications of urban path dependency
and tries to offer an analytical framework through which actual developments in various cities can
systematically be mapped out.  The paper proceeds then - by way of a comparative  contrast analysis -
with an empirical investigation of two dynamic  cities, Berlin and Amsterdam. Based on extensive field
work, an attempt  is finally made to offer clear  policy conclusions and recommendations for urban ICT
policy.
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1 . Setting the scene
In the history of mankind  cities have always played a crucial role. City formation was often a
result  of political,  socio-cultural en economie  forces  and was essential for the dynamics of an
economie-geographic system. City size was often contingent on the prevailing technology, such  as
water provision or transport systems. Lack of appropriate technology has in many cases of urban
history almost  meant an impediment to further urban growth. In our modem age information and
communication technology (ICT) may act as a new driver for urban dynamics.
At the beginning of the new millennium economies in general,  and cities in particular, exhibit
an unprecedented dynamics, offering new threats and opportunities. Cities have become sources of
hope and concern. A large part of the European Union  is, compared to other developed economies,
persistently suffering Erom unemployment (Castells 1996). Particularly cities exhibit considerable
employment losses. This has generated various responses from the side of urban policy-makers. There
are many cases where local administrations try to attract firms by refraining from taxing them in
various ways (Berkhout 1999). These regions are generally located at the edges of the EU, covering
Ireland, the British Midlands, the Northem part of the Netherlands, the Walloon  region, France,  the
Basque area, Finland, Southem Italy, Greece and East Germany. Sometimes a true fiscal paradise is
created, where enterprises do not have to pay any taxes on profit. These regions belong generally to
the poorest ones in Europe. The same applies to cities: mostly, industrial cities and port towns are
involved in such  revitalization polities  (Van den Berg et al. 1998). These places suffer often from so-
called dis-urbanisation and high unemployment figures. At the same time, Europe’s main cities, such
as Paris and London as wel1 as the Dutch Randstad and Southem German cities, amongst others,
experience a phase of new prosperity.
This paper aims at contributing to an explanation of the different dynamics of modem cities,
and to suggest policy perspectives for urban administrations conceming modem unemployment
policy. The basis of our investigation is formed by the notion of a technological revolution and of
subsequent path-dependence in the development of urban economies. It is undoubtedly true that
economie  history has been radically modified by various technological revolutions. It is remarkable
how  much the Industrial Revolution and the Electric Age have impacted on the last century. It seems
plausible that a new revolution, i.e. the ICT revolution, wil1 determine the face of the new millennium.
To assess the ICT impacts on urban development, we take for granted that current conditions may be
the outcome of smal1 events in (possibly remote) history. Against these background observations, we
address in this paper the question: which are the perspectives of urban development policy, in the light
of the ICT revolution?
In order to assess the urban consequences of the ICT revolution, it is necessary to identify its
characteristics. It is useful to offer fïrst  some definitions of information, transaction costs  and
‘economie revolutions’ from an ICT viewpoint.
We may refer here to Machlup (1983) and Ouwersloot (1994) for a treatment of information,
data, knowledge, meaning and known conventions. Knowledge is essentially an accumulated stock of
information based on synergy, while information refers to structured  flows of data (numerical or
symbolic description of phenomenon). Thus knowledge results from the adding,  (re)structuring,
editing, and other operative changes caused by the flow of information. Information is usually part of a
communication process  aimed at improving insights into (partly) unknown aspects  of a phenomenon.
The often adopted assumption of perfect information (e.g., in neoclassical analysis) is highly
questionable against the background of actual behaviour in which uncertainty and risk taking is rather
common. If the information process  were free of costs,  information would - within the borders set by
technology - always be completely available. But this is not the case. Transaction costs  lower the price
the demander is willing to pay, and raise the price the supplier wants to receive.  In both cases social
welfare is affected.
First, there are costs  faced by the demander of information. He/she has to decide what
information is needed, and has to search for the relevant information conceming prices, quantities,
quality, and the consequent possible set of suppliers. After information is acquired, a decision has to
be taken. The less information is available, the more time and costs  have to be spent in the decision-
making process.  We wil1 denote here the demander’s costs  as information search costs.
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Secondly, we need to consider the costs faced by the supplier of information. The
consumption of information does not limit others in consuming it; the character of information is non-
rival. “When  the supplier of infomation communicates  a part of his knowledge, this does not reduce
his own knowledge” (Ouwersloot 1994, p. 22). But since having a knowledge surplus offers the
opportunity to exercise power (i.e., to benefit  from asymmetrie  distribution of information), spreading
knowledge might depreciate  the suppliers’s relative position. The supplier of information cannot be
sure whether the demander wil1 act to his/her  benefit. Furthermore, the information sent by the
supplier has to bridge spatial and perceptive  (i.e., social, cultural, etc.) distance. It should thus be
edited in order to provide  the demander with the perception  that is pursued by the supplier
(Ouwersloot 1994). When a transaction is agreed, the supplier has to see to it that the transaction is
carried out.  In other words, he/she has to enforce the demander to pay the price agreed.
The information process  is closely connected with choice. The goal of engaging in the process
is making an optimal - or at least better - choice. The receiver of information goes on gathering
information, as long as the expected benefit  exceeds the costs. As expectations might turn out to lx not
correct, it follows that the receiver might stop looking for information when it is actually stil1 better to
obtain more.
The importante  of information and knowledge is enforced by the technological revolution in
the ICT sector (see Castells 1996). Communication and information can be subject to technological
changes, since they are essential to man’s coping with nature. It is important to distinguish between
technological change and diffusion of wealth. Technology sets the bottom to transaction costs. If
technology enables transaction costs to fall, social welfare can increase. The former does not mean
that the latter  occurs immediately and everywhere, as the Industrial Revolution showed (Castells
1996). So the revolutionary element is not primarily in the diffusion of wealth, but in the shift of the
technological boundary to wealth creation. Wealth creation is not only subject to technological
possibilities, but also to political,  social, institutional and cultural circumstances, since they provide an
economie  order (North 198 1).
In human history, periods of gradual change are sometimes interrupted by rapid, shock-wise
developments. This can be said of the Industrial Revolution (the steam engine, the railway locomotive,
the factory system) and the revolution of the second half of the nineteenth century - the Electric Age
(R&D laboratories, electricity, metallurgy) (Kranzberg and Pursell 1967; Castells 1996). Kranzberg
and Pursell (1967) argue that when man settled, this was the start of civilisation because man “could
not afsord  to live in constant conflict” anymore. So this was a point where,  since collaboration became
unavoidable, the necessity of information and communication increased dramatically. In a transaction
costs approach, one could say that costs were lowered, because it became possible to trade on the basis
of trust.
Since the mid 1970’s we have witnessed a rapid technological change in the field of
information processing, in particular in regard to its speed and capacity. In this context the term
‘Information and Communication Technology (ICT)’ is remarkably wel1 chosen.  In contrast to its
predecessors, the ICT revolution is characterised by the interplay  of information and technology,
rather  than just technology improving information processing. To identify ICT, we refer to machines
that are just there to store, process  and transmit information. Information has become a marketed
product itself, and the common definition  of information technologies  is “the converging set of
technologies in microelectronics, computing (machines and software),
telecommunications/broadcasting,  and opto-electronics” (see Castells 1996). The leve1 of information
processing made possibly by these products  enables further technological inventions. These machines
take over in a rapidly increasing number of households and enterprises. The increased centrality of
information for economie  activity renders the new technologies  essential, and accounts  for the
per\rasiveness of the ICT revolution.
The ICT revolution is signified by major changes in labour, capita1 and product markets.  Just
as the Industrial Revolution gave rise to the industrial society, that is to say, socialisation of work and
salarisation of wages, the ICT revolution leads to the information society, with its own characterisation
of work. The organisation of work is deeply changed, moving toward - as Castells (1996) - writes  ‘the
individualization of labor in the labor process’.  Life long leaming and ‘employability’ become crucial
factors  for employees, as knowledge becomes crucial for productivity, and innovation becomes
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decisive  for value added. Repetitive tasks in the work process can be automated, rendering traditional
institutions such  as lifetime job and salarisation of work obsolete. The stress is on decision-making,
not on assembly lines. When enterprises become networked in a global economy and when the scope
of possibly profitable transactions comprises the whole world, it is favourable to be ‘footloose’, to be
able to locate wherever it is most profitable to do so. In other words, existing job security institutions
may become brakes  on new possibilities for profit  generating.
It seems fair to conclude that an economie  revolution is taking place because of rapid
technological change with consequences influencing the core  of human economie  activity. ICT is the
source of it. It is important to identify changes  in the work process that are connected with the ICT
revolution. The latter  is the technological basis for the trend in job relations towards a loose, network
basis: the individualisation of work. It is noteworthy that the implementation of ICT revolution-
connected work processes interacts with institutions at various geographical levels. This leads US into
an exploration of the opportunities at an urban level.
2. Challenges to Urban Policy
In this section we wil1 address more specifïcally  the spatial component - in particular the
urban component - in the ICT revolution. The Industrial Revolution positioned the city already in the
centre of an economie-technological force field. The ‘marriage of science and technology’ (North
1981) generated high returns for modem cities, a position which was significantly enforced in the
Electric Age. In the second part of the twentieth century we have witnessed the emergence of sub-
urbanisation and tertiarisation, which meant often an erosion of city centres but a reinforcement of
metropolitan areas.  The rise of the ICT sector wil1 mean another challenge to urban policymakers at
the beginning of the new millennium, especially because the skills requirements for ICT workers wil1
lead to an upgrading of urban employment (occupational training, education, and on-the-job learning).
Consequently, also migration policy may become an important tool in an ICT driven city.
Improving the efficiency and transparency of the labour market is a logica1 instrument as well,
though mainly based on institutions requiring national action for change. They are often not subject to
the competente  of urban policy but to national govemments. Finally, it is possible to try to relocate the
demand for labour. Taxes and subsidies can be used to attract investors by either supporting input or
output. The former support can take the form of wage subsidies, capita1 investment subsidies, or other
resource-based support such  as energy tost  reductions. The latter  measure includes buying products  by
the public sector and price subsidies, while also administrative planning restrictions can be relaxed or
bureaucratie  processes simplifïed.  Consulting can be applied as well.
Labour market policy in Europe is mainly exercised at the national level. Al1 EU countries
have a system of unemployment benefits. The employment disincentive that might occur as an
obvious result  is clear; workers might have an incentive to quit their jobs, and the unemployed might
have an incentive to stay unemployed. On the other hand, one could argue that the income safety
provided enables the unemployed to search longer  for a more suitable job, increasing labour market
efficiency. Targeted polities  can influence employment more directly, involving less dead weight loss,
i.e. subsidies to those who  would have been employed anyway. They can assume different forms.
First, employment subsidies can be used to increase demand among groups experiencing persistent
unemployment (for example, youth unemployment and long-term unemployment). Second,  job
guaruntees  might benefit  the long-term unemployed. The form of unemployment under consideration
here is especially disadvantageous, because qualifïcation decreases with the period one is unemployed.
Long-term unemployment is persistent; it declines only very  slowly after economie  recovery has set in
(see Fallon and Verry, 1988). Third, work  sharing might be practiced, be it by means of early
retirement, splitting jobs, or shorter working hours. The problem here is that no net employment
increase occurs; meanwhile fïxed labour costs  rise. Firms and employees must be compensated, and
the net costs  of the measure are thus high. This situation occurs widely in Europe, especially with
respect to early retirement.
The labour market requirements of the information society are quite different from those of the
industrial society. The importante  of certain factors  declines, whereas other factors  gain importante.
Let US take a look at the factors  facing enterprises. The proximity to natura1 resources is no longer a
necessary requirement, because in many instances the wage differential between a European location
and a location with low wages (for example, in South-East-Asia or Eastem Europe) compensates  for
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the extra transport costs. Promising sectors in the information economy are not dependent on physical
work; it can be automated. Employment that cannot be replaced by machines becomes increasingly
important. The emphasis shifts towards those tasks that are non-programmable, where the human rnind
masters computers. The tasks involved with decision-making  gain importante.  So the existente  of  a
well-educated labour force replaces the proximity of physical labour as a geographical factor. But
even this picture appears, in a theoretical setting, irrelevant. Supplier and demander are mostly not
required to be at the same physical place for the economie  transaction to be carried out.
For example, ICT makes working at home at flexible time schedules ever better possible. It seems
appropriate in this context to deal concisely with telework. This possibility is, like many features of
the ICT revolution, not new. Rather, ICT enables it to be a more realistic alternative to large groups of
the workforce. After  all, besides imposing problems of superfluity on cities, it may serve as an
instrument to relieve  typically urban problems like traffic congestion and lack of space.  Location and
environmental factors  could be improved by it. Employers could save costs. Employees could improve
the co-ordination  of occupational and family activities. Bratzel en Dienel  (1999) mention  the
following urban implications:
l The number of centrally located companies  can decrease dramatically
l Micro-firms can evolve
l Virtual companies  with (partly) global interconnections can arise
Hence the condition  of qualified workers in the neighbourhood of the production site becomes
less relevant. At least, the possible radius of location is enlarged. Furthermore, due to the increased
scope of competition induced by the ICT revolution, employers want job relations to be more flexible.
So institutions addressing this matter are of importante  when looking for location altematives.
Today the characteristics of cities are very different from medieval times, but stil1 the city has,
because of its many inhabitants, a fluid labour market (Sassen 1994). So it is relatively easy for
employers to keep their production processes  at the preferred size. For cities, it means that
unemployment can differ enormously. The case for targeted polities  focusing on increasing demand in
sectors with overrepresentation of unemployment is thereby enforced.
On the other hand, the city attracts those who  are less interested in job security (e.g.,
migrants), because getting access  to employment is easier. The increasing opportunities offered by
ICT affect the importante  of suppliers to the citizen, too. It becomes less important to live near
retailers. With the (theoretical) possibility of telework and flexwork, the distance to jobs is far less
important. The average citizen can be described as eaming enough to be highly mobile, so choosing a
place to live on “weak” criteria (such  as quiet environment in suburban quarters, or the busy
excitement of inner cities) becomes possible. But the developments involved lead to polarisation, both
within and between cities.
In exploring the perspectives for urban employment and policy in our ICT age, it may be
interesting to see how  cities perform in the European urban system. In which urban areas does
economie  growth concentrate,  which industrial cities can and cannot keep up with current trends, and
how  do cities depend on each other? Various studies have tried to identify urban systems in Europe
(see Krätke 1995; Bratzel en Dienel  1999). They identify mainly two economie  growth regions, the
first from London via the Dutch Randstad, the Rhineland to northem Italy (called the ‘Blue Banana’),
the second  along the mediterrean toast, covering Milan, Barcelona, Grenoble and Valencia. It is
called the ‘Sunbelt’ region. Figure 1 provides an overview of this spatial - economie  force field in
Europe.
‘le-de-Prance
Urban networks are becoming less nationally oriented. Cities that were once at the periphery
sometimes are at once central.  It seems that a widening gap can be seen between those cities that
connect to the global network, and those that do not (Sassen 1994). Peripheral cities and old port cities
apparently have lost ground. Of course, this cannot be said of al1 old industrial cities. Some of them
reappear with new fùnctions. Many authors identify genera1 trends to construct a division, or
hierarchy, of European cities. Castells (1997, pp. 112-4) divides beween
l Metropolises, which gain power, because in these places centra1 decisions are made
l Declining old industrial cities apparently incapable  of adjusting to the new technologies  and
activities
l New regions attracting capita1 and labour, and becoming dynamic  economie  centres.
Krätke (1995) has made an interesting distinction, where  he draws on the quality and radius of
control capacities of firms and specialisation in innovative or traditional activities in the city. He
identifies the following types:
1. Global cities - intemational control centres  with concentration on high-qualified services.
Examples: London, Paris
2 . European metropolitan urban regions - concentration on European activity where  products  can be
innovative or industrial. Examples: Brussels, Berlin, Amsterdam, Milan, Stockholm
3 . Nationally important urban regions - locations of intra-national/regional  services and enterprises
where  products  can be innovative or industrial. Examples: Lyon, Barcelona, Copenhagen, Prague,
Rome
4. Cities with specialisation on innovative production structures  - concentration of fïrms  with
. flexible, networked production relations and a large supply of production-oriented service.
Examples: Stuttgart, Bristol,  Cambridge
5 . Cities with specialisation on standardised mass production - concentration of extemally controlled
enterprises with traditional industrial organisations. Examples: Porto, Manchester, Thessaloniki
6 . Marginalised urban regions - decline or lack of surviving industrial production enterprises with
low supply of production-oriented services, and a large informal economy.  Examples: Naples,
Palermo.
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It is clear that cities have not disappeared at all. Large cities are even growing (Sassen 1994).
So a view proclaiming the end of cities is certainly not correct, or has to be geared to special effects.
Earlier economie  revolutions were not accompanied by immediate population and employment
responses. Computers may be fast, but people adjust gradually. In our telework example, it may be
interesting to have a look at the possible antagonists of telework (see Table 1).
Table 1. Objections against telework
Unaware of the rationale for
telework; lack of pressure to
adopt telework
Concerns about middle
management to cape  with
change
hlivìdual managers “” ‘-~,
Absente  of a clear company
policy
Reluctance to add to the topics
being discussed with Unions
Difficulties in supporting widely
dispersed home-based
employees
Perceived diffculty  in
9nanaging  at distance”; fears
about loss of co~~troi
Uncertainly about employment
contract implications and
employees responses
Perceived and  actual prublems in
communicating with employees
.”
Source: European Telework Development (1998, p. 302)
European Telework Development (1998) reports that, apart from difficulties  in the
Teleworkhs  and poterhal  ’
teleworkers
Management seen as
unsupportive or resistant
CÖncems  about impact on career
- concern that “being out  of
sight” will  mean being out of
touch
Confusion about relative
responsibilities of individual,
manager and company
Practical concerns about home-
based working -
farnily impact, spatial
availability, differentation
between work/private  life
measurement of telework, it seems clear that it is only slowly adopted in Europe. Helten  and Fischer
(1999) come to fairly similar conclusions. Antagonists of telework provide  a good example of the
power of special interest groups; many people simply do not want to work at home.
Particularly strong institutions conceming the labour market seem to be at work in Europe,
rendering it rigid from an ICT-based viewpoint. Apart from that, man needs interaction with man.
Increased mobility causes extra possibilities toward profitable economie  transactions. As computers
cannot replace personal interaction, the spatial outcomes of the possibilities toward making these
profitable transactions, i.e. the cities, grow.
As far as the ICT revolution enhances possibilities for profitable transactions in an economie
sense, actors’ preferences are likely to become more divergent, and the possibilities of governments to
adjust the behaviour of actors become, indeed, restricted. Thus, firms and citizens are highly volatile
conceming their preferences, whether the implications are spatial, financial, or work-related.
Moreover, information is the source of economie  action by self-interested individuals. As they are able
to dispose over large amounts of information, it becomes increasingly diffrcult for the state  to know
which information they possesses. Subsequently, the state  cannot anticipate,  or steer economie  action.
Indeed, the amount of products  is enlarged dramatically, and traded electronically. The virtual
character of such trade makes policy very  difficult to implement. In addition, the global scope of
economie  transactions is not restricted by national boundaries. Whenever national policy is not
convenient  for an entreprise, it can quite  easily move its actions to other countries, with the
concomitant loss of employment and public income.  To be sure, complete footlooseness is not reached
by global markets. Workers are restricted in their mobility, and face-to-face contact remains central.
But economie  actors avoid transaction costs.  The global scope of trade provides  these actors with an
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Iincreasing number of altematives when transaction costs appear in the form of taxes or quantity
restrictions.
The future trend wil1 be, in the light of the developments set out alone, a logica1 development
from industrial modes of decision-making  toward networking and an individual approach. Urban
administrators wil1 recognise that standardised, hierarchical, centralised, quantitative, exclusive
measures are not appropriate. When trying to maximise the financial base, individual preferences need
to be taken into account. Institutions adapt only gradually to the new paradigm. The nation state loses
competente,  but stil1 dictates  the pace of urban physical planning and labour market policy, though a
trend toward decentralisation can be observed, strengthening competition among cities. The urban
administration does not function in a perfectly democratie  way. Self-interest guides its actors. It is
vulnerable to the collective  action of interest groups, likely to oppose against the individualised work
forms of the ICT revolution. It is not wel1 able to cape with the problems imposed on it. An obvious
question is whether urban policy in the next decades wil1 exhibit a sufficient  degree of resilience to
make the city survive. This wil1 be dealt within the next section.
3. Path Dependence  in Urban Development Policy
The economie  historian Paul A. David, in his “Clio and the economics of QWERTY”, deals
with the question how  the keyboard with the word QWERTY left on top became as accepted and
common as it is. After  all, when it is assumed that 40 keys are to be arranged on the board, 104*
outcomes are possible, and it has been shown that the QWERTY arrangement is not the most efftcient.
David argues that it is not technological superiority that determines the acceptance of products,  but
chance. The QWERTY arrangement was there because it was convenient  on the conventional
typewriter. As typists across  the globe were used to the system, it was adopted for computer keyboards
as well. The author defines  pathdependence as follows (David 1985, p. 332):
In a genera1 sense, when a product, by chance rather  than technological superiority, gains an
acceptance lead in early stages of the competition with other products, further acceptance becomes
more likely. The process  starts to accelerate,  and it is very likely that one single producer competes al1
rivals out.  The dynamic  result  is self-reinforcement. The notion of processing being Zocked-in involves
that early chance in the process  determines in which direction .a market tends to develop. But since the
product adopted may not be the best one, because its technology is not selected by technological
arguments but by chance, it is in no way clear  that the chosen path is optimal. For example, a
technology with low initial benefïts may prove to be superior as time elapses. But since another
technology with large early benefïts is chosen,  the former does not get the chance of being developed
further.
The topic of increasing returns was aheady  noted by A. Marshall  in 1890, stating that
whenever production costs fa11 as market shares increase, a firm that by good fortune happens to
attract a good deal of the market in the early adoption stage can beat its rivals. It is not a convenient
notion in economics, because the assumption of diminishing returns is dropped. The outcome is thus
not one of equilibrium; it becomes uncertain, in other words, it is non-ergodic (Arthur 1994, p. 27). It
is, however, not unlikely that producing more implies benefiting relatively more. During production,
the producer gains experience on how  to produce as cheap as possible (learning by doing). Certainly,
when  considering products with many technological features, this is an important factor. As well,
experience can enhance production of similar products  with the same technologies  (Arthur 1994, p. 4).
Because of existing networks and infrastructures, existing users may have only limited possibilities of
switching products.  Last but not least, as products  may be highly complicated in their applications,
information contagion may occur.
Indeed, it is commonly assumed that once production is increased, the marginal returns
decrease. This may be because of scarce production factors  not being capable  of being substituted, the
effect of increased demand on market prices.  Increasing returns thus need further exploration. As
Estrin and Laidler (1995) argue, it is not the product itself, but the features attributed to it that yield the
consumer the pursued satisfaction. There are several ways - possibly technologically different - to
achieve satisfaction. Let US now consider the features of competing products important in determining
the possibility of increasing returns. Certainly, increasing-returns goods and services must have some
durability  to imply inflexibility of transaction sequences facing consumers. When consumption of the
good is short in time, it is easy to switch in case of unsatisfying results.
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Next, products must compete on different technological features. To the producers of the
goods (assumed they compete), increased demand for the competitor’s product is lowering output.
They thus compete on prices. If we change this feature, and assume that both products have different
technological characteristics (such  as fuel for a certain group of cars),  the dynamics  change. When a
car producer sells more cars  of the group under consideration, the fuel producer can expect to sell
more fuel. To be sure, this case is not convenient  yet because when more fuel is sold, it is not an
indication that more of the appropriate cars  wil1 be sold. Increasing returns apply only to the fuel
supplier.
When competing products have the same technological features, path-dependence may occur
(for example, due to brand loyalty), but has no implications since in both cases the technological
development is the same. Arthur (1994) provides a proper example of increasing returns. In the video-
market, selling more video-recorders of a certain type means that more videocassettes wil1 be sold as
well. In turn, when more videocassettes are bought and (pre-recorded ones) rented, more people wil1
buy video-recorders of that type. Suppliers of different types of video-recorders are competed out.  So
when products are complementary (that is to say that they do not sell without each other), increasing
returns are possible, because there are compatibility restrictions between the goods provided by
competing firms. In other words, there exist network extemalities (Blankart and Knieps 1991): the size
of the network of consumers already using the technology is a determining factor with a positive
influence on consumers deciding which technology to adopt. As argued above consumers have
incomplete information about products with respect to the degree to which they satisfy needs. The
transaction costs  involved with obtaining more information makes them stop searching for more
information once they do not expect this to be profitable  anymore. This leaves them with having to
decide (partially) on the basis of expectations. It is not sure whether these expectations are the same.
They depend on the preferences about the product. Which product has the most satisfying features?
When preferences are homogeneous, it is likely that a single supplier, namely the supplier with the
most favourable product characteristics, gains al1 of the market. Once heterogeneity is allowed, the
outcome is probably market sharing and monopolistic competition. In both cases, network extemalities
are important, because a large network raises the use value of the product.
In short, when a new technological standard becomes available, consumers consider two
criteria before they switch networks (Blankart and Knieps 1991):
l The additional utility of adopting the new technology (the technology effect)
l The differente  in utility corresponding with the number of agents using the new standard (the
network effect).
The idea is that critical  mass is attained once sufficient  consumers have decided that the
technology effect compensates  for the (presumably negative) network effect. It is thus in the interest of
suppliers to provide the consumer  with the perception  that this is the case. Is asymmetrie  information,
resulting in adverse selection, the consequente?  It seems to be, as producers are likely to have more
information about their products than consumers (Estrin and Laidler 1995). But two qualifications
have to be added. First, consumers are not just acting on the basis of price information but of
technological features. This goes as wel1 for firms.  Second, the information available to producers
cannot be assumed to be perfect, because, in a dynamic  view, products are in early stages of
development here. It is perfectly possible that information division is asymmetrie,  but not necessarily
to the advantage of one of both parties (for example, in the QWERTY case).
Products with many technological features confront the potential consumer  with a choice
problem. When products have to fit into a network, the question of compatibility becomes all-
important. More often than not, a consumer has no knowledge about how  to connect (for example,
computer network systems). The same goes  for the amount and costs  of maintenance, the degree to
which the product can operate,  the uses the consumer has in mind, and how  to use the product. The
amöunt of information needed wil1 in many cases not be available because of high transaction costs  of
receiving it, and because of uncertainty regarding the supplier’s incentives and amount of knowledge.
In such  cases, it appears logica1 to ask previous and current users of selected products. Seen as a
process,  information is consequently spread selectively, as the information that the prospective
consumer gets is dependent on the choices made by previous users. Asking al1 users is impossible; it is
too time-intensive, so opportunity costs  are too high. Complete rationality would also imply using the
information that previous users gathered when  they were potential consumers - with the time intensity
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sky-rocketing. So let US assume that the potential purchaser only asks previous users without knowing
which product they use. In doing so, he/she obtains information about certain products, and these are
probably the products with the largest shares in the market. This is called information contagion
(Arthur 1994). The consequente  of it can be a pathdependent process. The suppliers with the largest
shares in the market have the largest probabilities of selling their products, so the process reinforces
itself. Although the potential consumer  may get information based on negative experiences, known
technological features can stil1 provide the potential customer with an incentive to choose the product
(this differs with the degree to which consumers are risk-averse, and with network externalities)
As the products enabling the ICT revolution are, indeed,  of a complicated technological
character, it seems reasonable to say that path-dependence can be observed in an increasing part of
product markets. Moreover, the rapid developments with respect to compatibility, processing speed
and applications speed up the products’ life cycles - the technology affect is omnipresent, and
increases uncertainty. The effects  are dependent on the degree to which potential purchasers act risk-
averse and rational. So path-dependence need not emerge, but the possibilities thereof increase.
Information contagion can be seen as a method to lower transaction costs  with minima1 loss of private
benefits, incorporating considerable  consequences for aggregate processes.  In the light of the previous
remarks, the notion that the economy becomes more subject to increasing returns is no giant leap.
Indeed, Karlsson and Larsson (1990) argue that in times of rapid technological change, the share of
product competition tends to increase. Product competition is interpreted here, broadly speaking, as
competing on technological features of products, and price competition as competing by trying to
maintain the lowest possible price. Indeed, ICT is al1 about technological competition and
compatibility. ICT equipment is relatively durable, moreover. Use of personal computers, Internet, and
satellite and cable television is, indeed rapidly increasing in the EU (Bratzel and Dienel  1999). But the
influence of ICT on consumer’s preferences deserves some consideration. If the assumption about
consumers becoming more heterogeneous is correct, pathdependence is possible only to a limited
degree. On the other hand, the video-recorder and QWERTY instances can be updated by the adoption
of Internet software, and differing features serving homogeneous needs in the field of personal
computers can certainly be identified. In this context, Karlsson and Larsson (1990) argue that product
competing enterprises locate in centra1 regions, and price-competing farms in peripheral regions. This
would imply that path-dependence is more likely to emerge in centra1 regions. But peripheral regions
are, in this way, dependent on technological development as well. If the argument about ICT-based
products competing on technological features is correct, just as the notion of rapid developments in
ICT sectors, a process of outsourcing price-competing products to peripheral regions is likely to take
place. Positioning the city as a supplier of location, ICT enables enterprises to take less account of
geographical factors.  Product markets can be found everywhere, but qualified workers are scarcer, and
not highly mobile in the European setting. Agglomeration economies  exist in this respect. ICT renders
transport costs  less relevant (though not obsolete, because of increased transactions possibilities), but
the highly technological base requires large amounts of knowledge. It seems likely that spin-off effects
are among the determinants of the location decision - they can be identifïed  as network effects.
Entrepreneurs shift attention toward local financial  and institutional frameworks. They stress flexible
work relations with respect to transport time and tost, labour regulation, and workforce potential.
Indeed, it seems fair to say that agglomeration economies  gain importante  throughout entrepreneurial
economie  history, and the ICT revolution is no exception. However, the location process wil1 become
more path-dependent. Leading branches of the ICT revolution locate in centra1 cities because these
cities offer knowledge potential and a fluid labour market. Only on the basis of knowledge is it
possible to exercise control; only a fluid labour market enables flexible work relations. To cities,
having established an infrastructure of leading branches makes the process reinforce itself. To
conclude, path-dependence offers a reasonable explanation for the polarisation process between cities.
The’process is not easily altered, because structures  already in place are decisive  here. As a result, a
spatial hierarchy of cities may emerge (see Table 2).
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Table 2. Hierarchy and dynamics of urban regions in two dimensions
Concentration of
International
Control  and
Finance capacity
And high qualifìed
Services’
Global cities
(1)
” .j “i. ,- .,,_  __  : .concentration’of ” ,_  ..,  >; .“.‘%  _I’  ‘. I, -: ‘.
Euro++  contr+  +d : European ‘-
fmänce c a p a c i t y  .: : ,,:! metropolitan
Agd high  qualified .__  .. regions
&+es3  ‘” (24 Pb)‘ : ‘>’
1~  __
.” -
, T !, , “,.  ” : . _‘* ‘.,  ,’
Concentration of
Regional  control and
finance capacity
And high qualified
Services
Nationally important urban regions
(34 (3b)
Cities specialised
in innovative
production
structures (4)
’ Innovative industrial organisations forms (conform “new  technologies”)
’ Vertically integrated, “Fordistic” industrial organisation
3 Control, finance and services capacity together form “metropolitan complex strategie  enterprise activities”
Source:  Krätke (1995, p. 141)
Path-dependece may be the reason why Krätke (1995) attritbutes global functions only to
London and Paris - it is the outcome of a self-enforcing process  impossible to countervail (see as wel1
Arthur  1994). Additionally, Kratke considers only cities with a concentration on innovative production
relations capable  of moving upward in the hierarchy. The dynamic  process  envisaged by Karlsson and
Larsson (1990) appears to shed light on the urban dynamics; it is more likely for products in the later
stages of their life cycles to be outsourced to regions with specialisation on traditional production
structures. Hence those regions have opportunities dependent on technological development. The
wage leve1 seems to be the main determinant here. Innovative regions, however, are dependent on
agglomeration economies  (i.e. spin off)  for development of new products - hence path dependence is
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experienced in those regions. The theory renders it seriously questionable cities can move from
classification 5 to 4, from 4 to 3a, and from 3a to 2a. Rather, global cities tend to increase the degree
to which they exercise control. European and nationally important cities with specialisation on
innovative production structures are capable  of that as well. Other cities however, can be considered to
experience problems attaining innovative production structures because they have no critical mass.
In this section we have tried to argue that the rise of ICT-products raises the share of markets
with path-dependent processes in the economy. Once certain suppliers (be it in product, location or
other markets) attain critical mass, they wil1 experience increasing returns to scale. The process  of
dividing market shares becomes self-enforcing. The city is confronted with such  processes in two
ways: first, price-competing firms tend to locate in other areas than product-competing firms. Second,
the city itself is a marketed product with highly complicated technological features. This concerns
mainly the location dicision by firms and individuals. Whenever urban govemment wants to alter
path-dependent processes, it wil1 have to do so rigorously. The costs  of making demanders overcome
network effects must be considered high. Aggresive policy, however, must be seen as highly
complicated to achieve.  Urban administrations are pathdependent thernselves in the light of the
incentives by urban bureaucrats. The goals set by urban govemment are highly compatible; without a
workforce, no enterprises wil1 locate. Without reasonable job perpectives, citizens, though not
perfectly mobile, want to migrate elsewhere. The city can thus attain critical mass in this respect.
Cities that do wil1 prosper, cities that do not might experience persistent problems only to be improved
by aggressive, costly polities.  One could even ask in some cases whether policy has any use at all.
This question wil1 be further addressed in the next section on the basis of a comparative  study on
urban developments in Berlin and Amsterdam.
4. A Comparative Case Study of Amsterdam and Berlin
In the preceding section we have described the nature of path-dependent processes, and argued
that they are, once in function, difficult to change. In the case of urban policy, there are many driving
forces  that cannot be influenced by the administration. By way of comparative  illustration, we wil1
discuss  here the cases of Amsterdam and Berlin.
It appears useful to examine cities with different historica1 backgrounds  and dynamics to
identify pathdependent processes in urban development. The analysis was based on structured
interviews with urban policy-makers. The interviews were subdivided into six parts:
l Introduction
l Genera1 questions on the problems facing the city
l ICT and urban development
l New ICT in the professional context
l Changes in urban administrations and politics
l Conclusion.
The interviews are, of course, not appropriate to derive statistical statements. The aim is to arrive
at a qualitative assessment of the perceptions by and approaches of legislators conceming urban
structure,  history, and administration in the light of the new ICT opportunities. We wil1 now first
present our findings from Amsterdam and Berlin in a carcise form.
Amsterdam
Urban labour market policy in Amsterdam is formulated as a centralised activity. Lower levels
of administration implement policy instigated by the national govemment; measures conceming job-
related education, for example, are purely directed by national instruments (Van Dam 1992). Urban
planning in the Netherlands has got a long history; it is formulated rather  centralised as well. Three
reasqns can be mentioned (Cohen and Nijkamp 1999):
l The fact  that large parts of the country are below sea leve1 implied, historically, a long struggle
against water. The maintenance of the water system caused a strong centra1 planning tendency.
l The high population density in and around Amsterdam causes  land use to have high opportunity
costs
l Income and economie  activity discrepancies between the Randstad and the rest of the country are
perceived as unpleasant in the politica1 arena, implying interference with market forces.
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However,  decentralisation is an ongoing process  now, but stil1 with communities
implementing the programmes of the state,  heavily dependent on it for finance. Specific  payments
contribute  a large share of bugets, limiting policy freedom severely (Van den Berg et al. 1998). Within
the administration of Amsterdam the economie  development department (Dienst Economische Zaken)
and the physical department (Dienst Ruimtelijke Ordening) are responsible for planning, the former for
enterprise location and the latter  for spatial planning. Their competente  overlaps, however. To provide
firms with a single communal reference point, a dedicated service for enterprise location has been
established in February 1998. Ten years ago, district administrations (stadsdelen) were created to
improve service to the citizens.
Urban policy in Amsterdam stresses  the lack of space,  environmental decay, traffc  congestion
and employment mismatch as main current problems. A relatively large amount of unemployed
persons are low qualified, whereas there is a deficit of high qualified workers. Amsterdam performs
particularly wel1 as a national and intemational finance centre and location of European headquarters
of firms (over 200 foreign farms and 62 banks are located in Amsterdam). The lack of space creates an
administrative problem as well: Amsterdam’s communal competente  is insufficient  to deal with many
interdependenties.  The city’s image is perceived as having structurally improved during the last
decade. The interviewers had highly different opinions, however. The administration’s image is
perceived as slow and bureaucratie.  Housing and accessibility must be seen as problematic. Still,
Amsterdam benefits of the appreciation of urban life.
The ICT revolution is perceived as improving efficiency in the administration; similarly the
economy is seen as more dynamic. Firms develop, move and decline much faster.  Al1 respondents
agreed on the notion that increased ICT use would only foster mobility; as Amsterdam has neglected
public transport for 20 years, traffic problems wil1 only increase. Nevertheless, Amsterdam has a long
history of media processing, and the culture to deal with ICT is perceived as good. Indeed, the city
comprises one of the five main global connection ports for the World Wide Web. The administration
itself may have to develop toward a project-based unit, as forma1 competenties  are too rigid to allow
for the high degree of interdependence of many policy issues. ICT can be used to foster service
towards citizens, but its use should not be overestimated, because ICT penetration is stil1 low. ICT
poses compatibility problems; various parts of the administration have different systems, with the
result  of problematic communication. On the other hand, as technological development proceeds
rapidly, it is perceived as useful to foster creativity by subsidiarity in systems adoption.
Main  critical factors in the future wil1 be national decision-making  on urban land, e.g. Schiphol
airport, and the degree to which Amsterdam can stay connected to the global network. The city cannot
reach the critical economie  base of London, Paris of Frankfurt, but with respect to its size, its control
capacity is remarkably high. It is a challenge to maintain and expand it.
Berlin
Urban development planning in Germany is up to states and communities; its organisation
differs consequently. The German system stresses  self-govemment. Since 1990 Berlin is organised as
a city-state (Bundesland). Its legislative body is responsible for both communal and state tasks; the
Lundesplanung,  is under its jurisdiction,  and subject to the goals set in the federal Raumplanung.
Those tasks are subdivided into the following departments, the SenatsverwaZtungen:
l Labour, professional education and women
l Construction, housing and traffic
l Finance
l Public health and social issues
l Intemal affairs
l Justice.
l Schools, youth and sports
l Urban development, environment and technology
l Economy and enterprise
l Science, research and culture.
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The number of administrations was ah-eady  cut down in 1992, and its planned to be reduced to
8 by the end of 1999. The mayor is less powerful than the prime ministers of other states - every
member of the senate is fully  responsible for his/her  own administration. The senate only determines
in case of disagreements among senators. Berlin has 23 districts (Bezirke). However,  a reorganisation
is planned, reducing the number of districts to 12 by the year 2001, in order to relief  the financial base
by reducing personnel and rationalise on service products and decision-making.
Berlin’s relatively independent position is mirrored in its considerable  legal competente
conceming labour market policy. The latter  kept many East Berliners from unemployment during the
post-reunification years. The amount, however, is declining. In June 1997 it was under 40.000, coming
from 100.000 in 1993. Berlin’s Senate uses 4 types of labour market policy:
l Additional financing  of federal labour market programmes
l Enterprise-orientated labour stimulation
l Professional advanced education
l Measures for integration of particular groups.
Conceming the fïrst  type, national labour market policy concemed over 50.000 persons in
1997. It involves temporally limited projects, wage subsidies for social services in the public sector,
stimulation of further education and training, cyclical measures, pension measures, and new
instruments with respect to training for long-term unemployment persons experiencing difficulty to
reintegrate, pilot-wise  employment, and subsidies for founding firms.  Stil1 the part of labour market
policy that aims at (re) integrating workers in the labour market is small, and many measures have an
ad hoc character. However,  the workforce of West Berlin is now signified by a disproportionate share
of low qualified workers, that of East Berlin by many high qualified  workers.
The administration in the city stressed sometimes highly different problems, including the
stagnating economy,  the rapid pace of polarisation and sub-urbanisation, the large differente  between
East and West, the lack of concepts  for stimulating Berlin’s economy, and the problems with respect
to adaption to the new conditions after reunification. High unemployment and employment mismatch,
though, are seen as central. ICT-related individualisation of work is seen as a threat to the city, but it is
believed that urban areas stil1 play major roles, as face-to-face contact cannot be replaced by ICT.
There is uncertainty on KT-induced  developments. ICT is seen as clearly increasing efficiency, both
in the private and public sector. But as the financial base of Berlin is poor, the administration is the
last one to adopt it. Much technological knowhow and competente  were traditionally outsourced to
private firms.  It is thus improbable that the administration wil1 integrate ICT in al1 its activities.
Synthesis
Amsterdam has faced rapid divergente  of the national unemployment rate during the early
1980s. Policy in the 1960s and 1970s fostered capital-intensive production structures.  The
bankruptcies of the early 1980s can be seen as a response to the abolition of such  policy (though the
national economie  crisis was a major cause as well). Here is a good example of path-dependent
economie  development. However, after 1984 renewed interest in Amsterdam can be observed,
conceming citizens as wel1 as firms.  Though the communal administration is highly restricted to
conform itself to national policy, its efforts in acquiring control functions can be seen as succesful.
Amsterdam seems to have critical mass: urban administrators trust on good policy enabling
Amsterdam to be a major hub in the ICT network. Favourable location factors  here are, apart from the
core  city, the good accessibility in the intemational context, the intemational education system and a
rather  high qualifïed  labour force. Moreover, many firms with high control capacity already reside in
Amsterdam; certainly more than one would expect from a fairly smal1 city.
This case provided a good example of the notion that leading cities in the global network are
intcmally  polarised; though Amsterdam’s economy performs welk the rate of unemployment among
the low qualifïed  stays high, at some 20%. It confirms that effective policy cannot rely on multiplier
effects  of locating firms in the services sector. Moreover, Amsterdam is confronted with a spatial
problem. Two reasons are the geographic location of the city between waters, and the well-developing
economy itself. The effect is, fïrst,  that housing construction becomes problematic to such an extent
that new quarters are now built in water, and second  that the administrative borders do not allow
Amsterdam to grow. The increasing returns of the city in the light of firm location wil1 increase the
severity of this problem. There is certainly no space  to locate industrial firms.  To conclude, although
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Amsterdam is a promising city in the global network, the perspectives for unemployment policy are
not necessarily great.
During the decades of politica1 separation, the dynamics of Berlin’s economy became static.
Policy implied normally unprofïtable  production to stay.  After 1989, al1  sorts of catching up trends
emerged: fast sub-urbanisation, skyrocketing unemployment figures, and rapid decline in the
possibilities for policy. The urban financial base is at historica1 depths now. However  drastically and
painfully, the structural change did not leave policy paradigms unaltered. Urban policymakers aim at
qualitative measures, which provide  the appropriate incentives, instead of relying on subsidies by
higher  levels of government. Al1  relevant divisions of the administration stress supporting only
knowledge-employing enterprises. Certainly, ICT-based farms provide,  if succesful, the city with more
dynamics. Offices require cleaning, it is said, so low-qualifïed labour benefits as well. There are
multiplier effects.  But it is questionable whether such  policy wil1 raise employment in al1  sectors, and
policy does not seem to address  low-qualified and long-term unemployment in particular. The sectoral
division of labour gives the idea that policy wil1 only lead to mismatches on the labour market.
Furthermore, the city has no particularly advantageous climate to innovative firms in the German
context. The knowledge pattem among workers appears overestimated. Innovative firrns have no
incentive to locate  in a fairly peripheral place  like Berlin, and the proximity to the federal govemment
does not seem to be attractive  to them, neither does the objective  of becoming an East-West focal
point. Eastem Europe can  be seen as a peripheral region with a comparative  advantage for price-
competing products.  Wages in Eastem Germany are quite rapidly catching up compared to Eastem
Europe, so Berlin does not have an advantage in price  competing products.  It has, though, a fluid
labour market due to high unemployment. But that is common in Eastem Germany.
Berlin has no critical mass. Indeed,  the city has the intemal polarisation characteristics of large
cities, but intra-urban polarisation is not to the city’s advantage. Headquarter location pattems do not
imply a structural increase of Berlin’s importante  in the European urban system; rather  the contrary. It
is interesting though, how  the govemment’s move to Berlin wil1 influence the economy. There is
potential of workers in the public sector, but ICT enables many firms to stay  far from govemment and
stil1 have intense communication. The number of fums  planning to locate  in Berlin is not promising.
Innovative employment seems thus the appropriate way, but. it is not successful because this is not
extensively applied. Policy may have to be more intense, but experience with subsidies, the serious
problems with Berlin’s fmancial base, and the comparably lowqualified parts of the labour force
prevent this. Berlin is stil1 under the influence of its history, and the emerging picture is a conl3rnation
of the urban hierarchy set out  above.
Comparing the two cities, the following theses appear to be confirmed:
l Cities in the global network are intemally polarised
l Polarisation between cities tends  to strengthen, in a pathdependent process
l Increasing returns in enterprise location are highly determining
l Even in cities with critical mass, it is difficult to lower low-qualifïed unemployment
l Acquisition of l%-ms  in the services sector does not sufftce as an employment policy
l The perception  among urban policy-makers differs; some even reject the notion of an information
society
l Policy is too gradual, and too difficult to adjust due to institutional frameworks.
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5. Concluding Remarks
Developed economies experience an economie  revolution. It is commonly named the ICT
revolution. This revolution changes  location factors. Location factors are not completely determined
on the basis of geographical, predetermined circumstances, neither are they determined purely on the
basis of economies of agglomeration. The ICT revolution tends to raise the importante  of
agglomeration economies because technologically competing products require large initial
investments and knowledge. The importante  of geographically determined location factors decreases
because communication possibilities lower transaction costs  dramatically. The consequent global
scope of markets renders enterprises and citizens footloose with respect to their physical
environments. Nevertheless, the importante  of face-to-face contact remains. Physical transport is
certainly not becoming irrelevant. Rather, the need for physical transport increases because more
transactions become profïtable.
However,  the increased relative importante  of economies of agglomeration causes  a path-
dependent, self-enforcing process  of concentrating economie  activity and growth in places that already
attained critical mass. These places are, in the ICT era, likely to be cities. Cities have a comparatively
fluid labour market, and concentrate knowledge. But their established economie  structure  is of
importante:  knowledge and physical infrastructure, and policy. Among cities, those that aheady  have
critical mass of productcompeting enterprises and a high-educated workforce tend to attain most
economie  activity. Small, exogenous events can be determining in attaining and losing critical mass.
Those cities not having critical mass face decline. Industrial employment, traditionally locating in
cities because of the large workforce offered, declines as rationalisation replaces man by machine, and
footloose firrns  can choose where to produce most profitably on a global scope. A path-dependent
process  of enterprise location is determining the European urban system.
European cities emerged mostly on the basis of geographical factors allowing profitable trade.
Politica1 factors were important to attract workers. The concentration pattem of economie  activity and
growth in Europe has been fairly constant since the emergence of cities, the main area being an axis
stretching from South England  via the Dutch Randstad cities and the German Ruhr area to North Italy.
The Industrial Revolution saw economie  activity shifting toward cities with a large, flexible workforce
and considerable  domestic markets.  The Electric Age strengthened the stress on large scale.  The
decades since 1970 have seen a shift of employment to higher  qualified  jobs and an accelerating shift
from industrial employment toward services employment in Europe. Additionally, increased mobility
enabled suburbanisation. Industrial cities face decline, whereas cities with innovative milieus, large
controlling competente  and a sophisticated workforce (implying critical mass) gain importante.  The
path-dependent process  leads to divergente,  inducing different employment outlooks for different
cities and for different groups within cities. The dialectic  of the ICT era is not between employers and
employees, but between those who  possess knowledge and intelligente,  and those who  do not. Second,
it is between those employed and those unemployed. The most problematic group is that of the low-
educated unemployed. Unemployment among these groups tends to reinforce itself, as they stay
unemployed longer. Employed workers have enough critical mass, be it in the form of special interest
groups, trade unions or independently, to keep unemployed workers from being a competing factor.
Moreover, unemployed persons lose knowledge, and they have no means and incentives to form a
special interest group.
This observation confronts urban employment policy-makers in different ways. Because
employment processes are path-dependent and bureaucrats are regarded as self-interested
representatives of cities competing for enterprises and citizens, policy is pathdependent too. The
appropriate differente  is between cities with critical mass, and cities without critical mass. Because
enterprises with supradomestic control functions wil1 not locate in the latter  places, unemployment is
likely to reach high levels in al1 sectors and among al1 qualifïcations. On the other hand, price-
competing products tend to be produced in peripheral regions. Assuming that the feature ‘without
critical mass’ overlaps with “peripheral”, such cities can attain lowqualified employment, assumed
they offer possibilities for low-tost production. Economie  growth worth mentioning is not to be
expected of this kind of employment, and firms  can migrate as soon as a more profitable region is
perceived. Policy aiming  at locating such firrns  is not reliable because the resulting economie  activity
is not of a character implying structural growth. On the other hand, policy just aiming at attracting
dynamic, innovative firms cannot be seen as providing sufficient employment to low-qualified
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workers. Cities possessing critical mass are confronted severely with unemployment among the low-
qualifïed  as well, because pricecompeting firms wil1 perceive locating there as too expensive.
Any policy trying to address unemployment will, in the light of the path-dependent employment
response to technological developments, have to be:
l Pro-active.  It appears particularly problematic to provide a countervailing power against
competitors with critical mass in an undesirable way, and attaining critical mass is highly
dependent on extemal factors.  Higher  levels of administrations, notably the national states, do
mostly not allow for such  policy, moreover
l Flexible. Because pathdependent processes are uncertain in early stages, it is appropriate to try do
direct them in a desired way. It is important to address exogenous events as fast as possible
l Turgeted.  Unemployment pattems are subject to structural differences likely to increase. There is
no use trying to fight these for individual cities, i.e. peripheral areas are very unlikely to succeed
in attaining innovative enterprises offering high-qualified employment.
l Structurul. The use of ad hoc subsidies is useless; it is even harmful, as it deprives farms of the
right incentives. Policy should aim at providing firms and citizens with the right urban knowledge
and physical infrastructure.
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